En los 250.000 documentos de Wikileaks la expresión “república bananera” aparece en 51 ocasiones. Diplomáticos de naciones como Turquía, Rusia, Marruecos y España (Miguel Ángel Moratinos en marzo de 2004) dejaron claro a sus interlocutores de Estados Unidos que sus países no eran una república bananera. Y sin embargo, en el caso más reciente de golpe de Estado en Latinoamérica, el concepto sobrevuela por muchos telegramas, pero no aparece por ningún lado.

Los cables redactados en la Embajada estadounidense de Honduras tras el golpe del 28 de junio de 2009 contra el presidente Manuel Zelaya muestran todo lo que se asocia con un país sin instituciones fiables y bajo la sombra de Estados Unidos: un político que ocupó la presidencia (Roberto Micheletti) en nombre de la honestidad y el despotismo tuvo que ser amenazado por Estados Unidos con la retirada del visado para que dejase el cargo. Micheletti, según la embajada, aprovechó la crisis provocada por el golpe para amañar contratos corruptos hasta el último minuto.
Otro político, Porfirio, Pepe, Lobo, el hombre que sucedió a Micheletti, intentó nombrar ministro de Defensa al general que perpetró el golpe (Romeo Vásquez Velásquez). El embajador estadounidense le aconsejó que destituyera al general para salvar la cara ante la comunidad internacional antes de tomar posesión del cargo de presidente. Pepe Lobo le consultó sobre la posibilidad de poner a Vásquez Velásquez al mando de la Empresa Nacional de Electricidad y el embajador se pronunció en contra. Lobo le pidió consejo sobre personas a las que podía nombrar en puestos de Interior. Todo eso y mucho más quedó consignado en los telegramas. Bajo el nombre del embajador Hugo Llorens.
El antecesor de Llorens, el diplomático Charles A. Ford ya emitió un cable el 16 de marzo de 2006, con motivo de los primeros 45 días de José Manuel Zelaya en el poder, en el que expresaba los titubeos de Zelaya a la hora de seguir las indicaciones de Estados Unidos. Y eso, a pesar de que “cambió a su ministro de Exteriores” por indicación de Estados Unidos. Y a pesar de que hizo “literalmente” esperar a los presidentes de Centroamérica y al de México, Vicente Fox, para reunirse con el fiscal general, Alberto Gonzales, “en su primer encuentro oficial” como presidente. “Zelaya debe basarse en su sincera actitud pro Estados Unidos e ignorar el aparente resentimiento hacia la dependencia de Honduras respecto a Estados Unidos, con algunos de sus consejeros molestos por el obvio poder económico y político de Estados Unidos”, escribió Charles A. Ford.
El golpe de Estado
Sin embargo, Zelaya a mitad de su mandato estrechó su relación el presidente venezolano Hugo Chávez. Y se fue granjeando la enemistad de la élite económica hondureña. Hasta que en la noche del 28 de junio de 2009 fue sacado de su casa y expulsado en pijama y a punta de fusil hacia Costa Rica. Al día siguiente, Roberto Micheletti ocupaba su puesto. Unos le empezaron a llamar el presidente golpista; otros, como el venezolano Hugo Chávez, le apodaron Goriletti; y algunos, como el embajador estadounidense Hugo Llorens se referían a él como “presidente de hecho”. En cualquier caso, llegó al poder sin que nadie lo hubiese votado y abandonó la presidencia el 21 de enero, seis días antes de que Lobo jurase el cargo presionado por Estados Unidos para que se quitara de en medio de la escena política y no soliviantara a la comunidad internacional.
Un mes después del cese, el embajador de Estados Unidos escribía: “Mientras el presidente de facto, Roberto Micheletti, y sus colegas se retrataban a sí mismos como profesionales de un Gobierno honesto y eficiente, ellos parecen haber amañado tratos en la sombra que eran mayúsculos incluso para los estándares locales. La aprobación de un gran contrato hidroeléctrico con tan escaso beneficio para el Estado, justo una semana antes de que el régimen deje la oficina es el principal ejemplo. (…) Fuentes fiables de la Embajada han implicado directamente a Micheletti y a algunos de sus socios más cercanos en este contrato. Miembros del Congreso y otros que en tiempos normales habrían efectuado un escrutinio del caso estaban distraídos con la crisis política y las elecciones”.
Hugo Llorens se refería a la concesión de la licencia de explotación de la represa José Cecilio del Valle a un consorcio hondureño-italiano del que el propio Micheletti era socio. Aunque el cable del embajador no recoge este dato un informe del 22 de febrero de 2010 del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas hondureño revela que la concesión fue efectuada cuando aún no había concluido el contrato con la empresa española Elecnor. La publicación de la concesión en La Gazeta -el equivalente en Honduras al Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) de Honduras- estuvo plagada de irregularidades. “Fue la primera vez que se falsificó La Gazeta en la historia de nuestro país”, recordaba esta semana Manuel Gamero, director del diario hondureño Tiempo.
Y la prensa hondureña se centró en la aparente ocultación del contrato. Pero el embajador señalaba que la concesión en sí misma era más grave que la supuesta falta de transparencia.
“Según las fuentes de la Embajada, Micheletti fue uno de los socios hondureños que facilitó la concesión”, indicaba el cable fechado el 20 de febrero de 2010. “Los principales facilitadores fueron Saavedra, el ministro de Obras Públicas de Micheletti, Saro Bonanno y los íntimos de Micheletti Johnny Kafati y Roberto Turcios. Es inconcebible que este contrato pudiera haberse conseguido sin el conocimiento de Micheletti”.
Revisión de los contratos
El diplomático se mostraba confiado porque Pepe Lobo, el hombre que asumió el cargo de presidente tras unas elecciones no reconocidas ni por la Unión Europea ni por la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), había prometido revisar esos contratos. Entre el embajador y el presidente electo de Honduras había buen entendimiento. Tras ganar las elecciones de noviembre de 2009, Pepe Lobo decidió irse de vacaciones a Nueva Orleans. Tras su regreso, acudió a la embajada el 4 de enero de 2010 y le agradeció a Hugo Llorens que hubiese notificado su visita a la Seguridad Diplomática de EEUU, con lo que pudo disfrutar de relativo anonimato y prescindir de gran parte de la seguridad que le correspondía llevar como presidente electo de Honduras. Después, el embajador le dijo que tenía que insistir a Micheletti para que se vaya “inmediatamente” y dejase paso a un Gobierno de unidad nacional. Estados Unidos le ofrecería incentivos para dejar el Gobierno, pero en caso de que no lo hiciera le retiraría el visado.
Después, Lobo reconoció que él no era ningún experto en seguridad y pidió al embajador que le recomendara algunos nombres para el ministerio. El diplomático le prometió ayuda. Pero el embajador entró de lleno en un tema que durante las semanas siguiente iba a ocasionarle bastante trabajo: el caso del general golpista Vásquez Velásquez. “[El embajador] hizo notar que había oído que el jefe de Estado Mayor de Defensa, Vásquez Velásquez, estaba presionando duramente para ser nombrado ministro de Defensa, y esto sería visto muy negativamente por la comunidad internacional, dado el papel que desempeñó Vásquez en el golpe. (…) Lobo dijo que Vásquez estaba en su lista para ministro de Defensa y que él no había considerado las implicaciones internacionales de tal nombramiento, pero veía claramente el argumento del embajador. Lobo dijo que no lo nombraría”.
Días después, el 23 de enero, Lobo informó al embajador de que le había ofrecido a Vásquez Velásquez un puesto al frente de la Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica. Pero el embajador adujo que eso no sería bien visto por la comunidad internacional. Y mientras tanto, Vásquez Velásquez, continuó al mando del Ejército. Varias semanas después, el 14 de febrero de 2010 el diplomático recibió en su embajada durante 90 minutos al presidente de Honduras. Hugo Llorens le recordó que ya habían discutido en dos ocasiones, el 23 y el 29 de enero, la necesidad de que eliminase de su Gobierno al responsable de Defensa, Lionel Sevilla, y al jefe del Estado Mayor, Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, miembros ambos del régimen de Micheletti. Lobo objetó que si actuaba precipitadamente, los militares podrían volverse contra él. Y reconoció que estaba recibiendo presiones para nombrar como jefe del Ejército al general García Piagget. El embajador le respondió que los dos militares más vinculados al golpe eran Piagget y Vásquez Velásquez. Así que mejor haría en descartar esa idea. En su lugar, el diplomático sugirió el nombre del general Doblado, “un meticuloso y altamente respetado oficial”. Y añadió que si esperaba más tiempo para poner orden Defensa, “las críticas de la comunidad internacional no tardarían en llegar y su decisión sería vista como un sometimiento a la influencia exterior, lo que sería peor”.
Espionaje telefónico
Finalmente, un mes después, en marzo de 2010, Romeo Vásquez Velásquez fue destituido del Ejército. No obtuvo la presidencia de la Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica pero sí la gerencia de la Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones, Hondutel. Las voces críticas indicaron que con ese nombramiento se incrementaría el espionaje telefónico. Su sustituto no fue el hombre que recomendó el embajador en un principio, sino el general Carlos Antonio Cuellar, uno de los seis militares acusados por el fiscal general de abuso de autoridad al detener y expulsar al presidente de Zelaya.
En otro documento del ocho de enero de 2010 se informa de que el general Vásquez Velásquez le dijo al embajador que los militares respetarían la autoridad del ministerio público, pero… “[el general] expresó su esperanza de que el Congreso aprobaría una amnistía que afectaría a todos los que intervinieron en la crisis política de Honduras y en el golpe”. Así ocurrió el martes 26 de enero de 2010. Cuéllar fue nombrado jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército en marzo. Y los cables filtrados por Wikileaks solo abarcan hasta febrero de 2010.
El pasado viernes 28 de enero, Cuéllar fue relevado en su cargo por el general René Osorio Canales, jefe de la guardia de honor presidencial de Porfirio, Pepe, Lobo. Osorio Canales fue el oficial que entró en la casa del presidente Zelaya para sacarlo en pijamas
a punta de fusil en mitad de la noche. Ahora, es el jefe del Ejército en Honduras.

Cable que se refiere a un supuesto caso de corrupción de Micheletti

El embajador asegura que Micheletti aprovechó la confusión provocada por la crisis política tras el golpe de Estado para adjudicar contratos poco transparentes y sin ningún beneficio para el Estado

Cable sobre la acusación contra militares por la expulsión de Zelaya

Es la única vez en que aparece citado en los documentos Carlos Antonio Cuéllar, el general al que el actual presidente de Honduras nombró como jefe del Estado Mayor

Cable en el que EE UU pide a Lobo que destituya al jefe del Ejército
El embajador de Estados Unidos pide que el general Vásquez Velásquez deje el cargo por sus vínculos con el golpe de Estado
29/01/2011
Vota Resultado  0 votos

ID: 245412
Date: 2010-01-26 00:55:00
Origin: 10TEGUCIGALPA65
Source: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Classification: SECRET
Dunno:
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RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//CINC/POLAD// IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000065
NOFORN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PREL, PHUM, HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT ELECT
LOBO, PRESIDENT ZELAYA AND PRESIDENT ARIAS
REF: TEGUCIGALPA
TEGUCIGALP 00000065 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (b & d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador had a series of meetings
and discussions over the past weekend with President-elect
Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo, President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, and
Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. Lobo briefed the
Ambassador on his diplomatic efforts of the past week with
both Presidents Fernandez and Colom. He said his visits to
the Dominican Republic and to Guatemala had gone well and he
had been well received in both countries. He discussed the
agreement negotiated with Fernandez to provide safe passage
for Zelaya out of the Brazilian Embassy and to be escorted by
Fernandez to the Dominican Republic. He confirmed that
President Colom would also be in Tegucigalpa on January 27.
Lobo discussed his planned cabinet appointments and policy
priorities, and the creation of a government of national
unity. Zelaya told us that he supported the Fernandez-Lobo
pact allowing him to be able to leave Honduras with several
members of his family. President Arias is not likely to
attend the inaugural ceremony expressing disappointment that
Lobo had been unable to convince regime leader Roberto
Micheletti to resign. However, Arias made clear that he
would recognize the Lobo government and would work closely in
support of the new Honduran government. End Summary.
———————————
Meeting with President-elect Lobo
———————————
2. (S) The Ambassador and Honduran President-elect Porfirio
“Pepe” Lobo met for coffee at the residence on January 23 and
reviewed the latest political and diplomatic developments.
The meeting took place in the wake of Micheletti’s January 20
decision to take a leave of absence and Lobo’s own successful
diplomatic trips to the Dominican Republic to meet Dominican
President Lionel Fernandez and to Guatemala for a meeting
with Guatemalan President Colom. The following are the main
elements of the discussion:
3. (S/NF) Visit to the Dominican Republic: Lobo said he was
very pleased with the results of his January 19 visit to the
Dominican Republic. He expressed great appreciation for U.S.
support for the efforts by President Fernandez to resolve the
issue of President Zelaya’s presence in the Brazilian Embassy
in Tegucigalpa. He discussed the written agreement he had
reached with Fernandez whereby Fernandez and Colom would be
in Honduras on January 27 to possibly attend his inauguration
and then pick-up Zelaya at the Brazilian Embassy and escort
him out of the country. Lobo said that Zelaya would go with
Fernandez to the Dominican Republic and stay there for a
time, but that his longer term plan was to settle in Mexico.
Lobo said he was committed to providing safe passage to
Zelaya to leave the Embassy and said he had discussed the
legal aspects with Attorney General Rubi, since Zelaya faced
criminal charges in Honduras. Lobo noted that Rubi had
agreed to find a constructive legal way to get this done.
Lobo (please protect) described Fernandez as a “real
operator” but very effective. He mentioned that Fernandez
had asked him to consider rejoining ALBA saying that such an
action would help ease the process of Honduran reintegration
in the Inter-American system. Lobo responded that while he
would attempt to maintain the Petro Caribe arrangement that
provided favorable credit terms from Venezuela for the
purchase of hydrocarbons products, he had no intention of
bringing Honduras back into the Bolivarian alliance.
4. (S/NF) Political Amnesty: Lobo said he remained committed
to securing political amnesty for all of the players involved
in the Honduran political and constitutional crisis,
including Zelaya, Micheletti, and the Honduran military. He
believed that securing political amnesty legislation provided
a platform of stability that would facilitate the work of the
Truth Commission. He said approval of this legislation would
TEGUCIGALP 00000065 002.2 OF 003

be the first task of the act of National Party controlled
Congress.
5. (S/NF) Visit to Guatemala: Lobo said that he had just
returned from a successful January 21 visit to Guatemala for
a meeting with President Colom. He said President Colom had
been very friendly and eager to establish a close working
relationship with his new government. Colom committed to
attend the inaugural ceremony in some manner. Colom was
considering arriving at the stadium and formally recognizing
Lobo’s presidency as soon as Lobo had taken the oath from the
new Congress President Juan Orlando Hernandez. He said that
Colom had committed himself to attempt to convince Fernandez
and possibly Funes to also participate in the inaugural
festivities in some way and not just be available to escort
Zelaya out of the country.
6. (S/NF) Presidential Appointments: Lobo said he was also
focused on completing the creation of his cabinet. He noted
that former Ambassador to the U.S. (during the Maduro
Administration) Mario Canahuati would be his foreign
minister. He said that Canahuati had the experience and
knowledge of the U.S. to serve as his senior foreign
policymaker. Lobo also said that he would be appointing
technocrats William Chong Wong and Maria Elena Mondragon to
serve as Minister of Finance and Central Bank President,
respectively. He noted that Chong and Mondragon had held
these positions in the Maduro Administration as well. He
stressed the severity of the Honduran economic downturn
required a veteran team with strong executive experience.
The Ambassador mentioned his meeting with Treasury Deputy
Assistant Secretary Nancy Lee and the importance of beginning
a policy dialogue with his economic team as soon as possible.
The Ambassador mentioned that he was aware that Chong Wong
and Mondragon had already met with Lee in Washington on
January 22.
7. (S/NF) Lobo discussed lobbying by outgoing Defense Chief
General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez for the minister of defense.
Both agreed that although Vasquez Velasquez had been helpful
in efforts to implement the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord his
direct links to the coup made it impossible for him to remain
in the military chain of command. Lobo said he had offered
the General a position in government such as the National
Electric Company (ENEE) where his executive and managerial
ability would be helpful. The Ambassador noted that
appointing individuals to senior cabinet positions that had
direct links to the coup would harm his government and his
own efforts to restore strong ties with the international
community.
8. (S/NF) Lobo said he was very pleased that we had been able
to convince Democratic Unification leader Cesar Ham to join
his government. Ham would be appointed as Director of the
National Agrarian Institute, which is a powerful government
agency responsible for land tenure policy and ties to the
campesino movement. Lobo said Ham’s participation in
addition to Christian Democrat presidential candidate
Felicito Avila (appointed Minister of Labor), PINU standard
bearer Bernard Martinez (Minister of Culture), as well as a
Liberal Party member, would ensure a strong multi-party
representation in his government. Lobo thanked the
Ambassador for our active encouragement of Ham, Avila and
Martinez to support the new government.
———————————-
Conversation with President Arias:
———————————-
9. (S/NF) The Ambassador spoke to President Arias just prior
to his meeting with Lobo. Arias reiterated that he was
somewhat disappointed with Lobo since he did not believe he
had been forceful enough in getting regime leader Micheletti
to resign. He said he had already vowed not to attend the
inauguration and it would be difficult for him to change his
TEGUCIGALP 00000065 003.2 OF 003

position now. The Ambassador told Arias that no one had done
more to seek to restore the constitutional order and to
achieve a negotiated and peaceful solution to the crisis than
he had. The Ambassador pointed out that Honduras continued
to need his support and guidance. The Ambassador said that
the U.S. would be sending an official delegation to the
inauguration that would probably be led by Assistant
Secretary Arturo Valenzuela. The Ambassador also briefed
Arias on the Fernandez agreement with Lobo to get Zelaya to
leave the Brazilian Embassy and travel to the Dominican
Republic on January 27. Arias responded that the U.S.
presence would be positive and help other countries engage at
least after Lobo assumes office. Arias said he would take
our views into account in terms of Costa Rican participation
in the inauguration, but would most likely ask his ambassador
to attend the ceremony. The idea of going to the Brazilian
Embassy and escorting Zelaya out of the country was somewhat
intriguing to him, but he made no commitments. Arias made
clear he intended to recognize the newly-elected government
and work constructively with Lobo. He said he was thinking
of inviting Lobo to visit Costa Rica soon after he assumes
office. (Note: While the Ambassador was speaking to Arias,
Lobo came to the Residence and Arias expressed interest in
speaking directly to Lobo. The two chatted amiably for 8-10
minutes. Lobo attempted to convince Arias to attend his
inauguration and said he intended to provide special
recognition for Arias at the ceremony for his crucial role in
seeking to resolve the crisis. Lobo said that even if he did
not attend, he hoped to invite him to Tegucigalpa in the near
future and honor him in some way.
———————————-
Conversation with President Zelaya:
———————————–
10. (S/NF) The Ambassador called President Zelaya to
reconfirm that the U.S. would be sending an official
delegation to attend the inauguration. The Ambassador noted
that we expected A/S Valenzuela to lead our delegation that
might also include NSC Senior Director Dan Restrepo Assistant
Secretary for Economic Affairs Jose Fernandez and PDAS Craig
Kelly. The Ambassador told Zelaya that our delegation would
be seeking a meeting with him probably on Tuesday. Zelaya
said it would be good for the U.S. to be present in Honduras
for the inauguration and he looked forward to the meeting
with Valenzuela and the U.S. delegation. He confirmed that
he was fully supportive of the Fernandez-Lobo pact and that
he planned to leave Honduras for the Dominican Republic on
January 27. Zelaya claimed he had encouraged UD leader Cesar
Ham to join Lobo’s government of national unity, which he
believed was essential to ensure peace and harmony.
LLORENS

Cable sobre la insistencia de EE UU para el relevo del jefe del Ejército

El embajador estadounidense insiste a Lobo en que el tiempo se está agotando y si él no toma medidas para destituir al general Vásquez Velásquez, la comunidad internacional le presionará y entonces parecerá que actúa sometido a las presiones de fuera

Cable que se refiere a un supuesto caso de corrupción de Micheletti

El embajador asegura que Micheletti aprovechó la confusión provocada por la crisis política tras el golpe de Estado para adjudicar contratos poco transparentes y sin ningún beneficio para el Estado

Cable en el que EE UU habla de los titubeos de Zelaya

El embajador en Tegucigalpa lamenta que el entonces presidente de Honduras no siga al pie de la letra sus indicaciones, a pesar de que sí “cambió su ministro de Exteriores” por indicación de Estados Unidos

ID:	56893
Date:	2006-03-16 20:23:00
Origin:	06TEGUCIGALPA526
Source:	Embassy Tegucigalpa
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:	05TEGUCIGALPA2418 05TEGUCIGALPA2419 05TEGUCIGALPA2420 05TEGUCIGALPA2492 06TEGUCIGALPA100 06TEGUCIGALPA161 06TEGUCIGALPA193 06TEGUCIGALPA214 06TEGUCIGALPA344 06TEGUCIGALPA355 06TEGUCIGALPA433 06TEGUCIGALPA482 06TEGUCIGALPA505 06TEGUCIGALPA521
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TEGUCIGALPA 000526 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S, D, P, E, AND R STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, WHA/EPSC, AND WHA/CEN STATE FOR EB, INL/LP, PM, PRM, DRL, CA, AND DS STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAM NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR DDOUGLASS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2036 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ETRD, MOPS, SMIG, PINR, KCRM, HO SUBJECT: ZELAYA ADMINISTRATION’S FIRST 45 DAYS – PRO-U.S. ZELAYA OFTEN TORN IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS BY ADVISORS REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 521 (FUEL) B. TEGUCIGALPA 505 (FUEL) C. TEGUCIGALPA 482 (FUEL) D. TEGUCIGALPA 355 (PRC/TAIWAN) E. TEGUCIGALPA 344 (AGRICULTURE) F. TEGUCIGALPA 214 (PRC/TAIWAN) G. 092106Z MAR 06 USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO (MOD) H. TEGUCIGALPA 433 (CRIME) I. TEGUCIGALPA 193(ZELAYA/GONZALES BILAT) J. TEGUCIGALPA 161 (ZELAYA BRIEFINGS) K. TEGUCIGALPA 100 (ZELAYA/FORD BILAT) L. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2492 (POL ASSESSMENT) TEGUCIGALP 00000526 001.2 OF 007 M. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2420 (ECON ASSESSMENT) N. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2419 (ECON ASSESSMENT) O. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2418 (ECON ASSESSMENT) Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Honduran President Jose Manuel “Mel” Zelaya and his Administration have now been in office approximately 45 days. While Zelaya is clearly a friend of the USG, as Post predicted his personality, administration, and policy decisions are making working with him a challenge. On the plus side, Zelaya has moved with resolve to conclude CAFTA for an April 1 implementation, supports USG efforts on counter-narcotics, has cooperated on deportation issues, and has accepted U.S. DOD assistance in drafting a Honduran National Security Strategy, with a workshop for his Administration planned for May 5-7. However, there have been delays in reforming Immigration, crime appears to have worsened, and economic policy is a mixed bag, with fuel being a particularly controversial issue. Post is also concerned by the attention being paid to the more ideological voices within the Zelaya administration. Some in the Zelaya Administration may be showing their true colors — some populist or radical, other merely concerned with protecting their business interests. Zelaya strikes us as a pro-U.S. political pragmatist, but one somewhat beholden to the competing forces within his party. Ambassador and Zelaya had a lengthy discussion March 14 (hosted by Former President Carlos Flores) to try to clear the air and improve bilateral communication. While communication will hopefully improve, Zelaya must take a more active leadership role if he seeks to establish rational policymaking in his Administration. End Summary. Pressure From Different Camps in Liberal Party ——————————————— – 2. (C) The Ambassador and the Country Team have established a close working relationship with President Zelaya and his cabinet. As President-elect, Zelaya and three of his advisors met on January 20 with the Country Team at the Embassy for a one-hour country briefing followed by a half-hour session dedicated specifically to CAFTA (ref J). This meeting came after a January 11 Country Team briefing of several of Zelaya’s designated ministers, and a January 13 luncheon meeting between the Ambassador, DCM, and the President-elect and his private secretary, Raul Valladares (ref K). President Zelaya has also held meetings with the Ambassador several times at the Ambassador’s residence, both before and after his inauguration. From day one, Zelaya has relished the idea of meeting President Bush (a TEGUCIGALP 00000526 002.2 OF 007 meeting is tentatively set for June) and he literally made the Central American presidents and Mexican President Vicente Fox wait outside while he made Attorney General Gonzales the first official meeting of his presidency (ref I). Even before that, with one day’s notice he brought his most senior leadership to San Pedro Sula to see R U/S Hughes and WHA Assistant Secretary Shannon, and he changed his Foreign Minister-designee at the Ambassador’s request. There has been a consistent thread in Zelaya Administration, whether from Zelaya himself, his VP, or his ministers, and it has been pro-U.S. 3. (C) What appears to be causing some confusion in Zelaya’s policies are competing camps in the Liberal Party seeking to influence Zelaya’s decisions. Liberal Party President Patricia Rodas and two prominent cabinet ministers, Minister of Government and Justice Jorge Arturo Reina and Minister of Foreign Affairs Milton Jimenez, have a strong left-leaning backgrounds. (However it is critical to note that these same advisors go out of their way to make clear they value the bilateral relationship with the U.S.) In a possible indication of more ideological influence from these advisors, and in a possible contradiction to then-head of transition and now Minister of Finance Hugo Noe Pino’s December 2005 statements to PolChief that a Zelaya government projects no change in relation with Taiwan or China, Honduras appears to be toying with closer relations to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) at the potential expense of Taiwan. This is despite the fact that Zelaya plans to visit Taiwan soon. While the GOH may just be seeking an expanded commercial relationship with the PRC, an understandable goal, and not want to break relations with Taiwan, its repeated discussion of the issue leads Post to wonder what the GOH’s intentions are. (See refs D and F for details.) On Cuba, as Noe Pino told PolChief prior to the inauguration and FM Jimenez has reiterated publicly, Zelaya intends to send an Ambassador to Cuba, probably in 2007. Bilateral relations were reestablished by the Flores Administration and maintained by the Maduro Administration. There has been a Charge d’Affaires but not yet an Ambassador. 4. (C) The different camps in the Liberal Party, led by Rodas/Jimenez, Reina, San Pedro Sula business tycoon Jaime Rosenthal (father of Minister of the Presidency Yani Rosenthal), former President Carlos Flores (who appears to be seeking to bolster Vice President Elvin Santos’ standing), and others, leaves a Zelaya Administration torn in different directions. While some of this may be healthy, in that he is receiving competing views, much of it is counterproductive as different factions fight for power and influence. Contacts in the National Party have voiced their interest in this intra-party fight. Zelaya has chosen to appoint six of his seven easily vanquished presidential primary opponents to cabinet-level positions, and appointed the seventh’s son (Yani Rosenthal) also to the cabinet. This despite the fact that congressmen who ran on Zelaya’s ticket in the primaries constitute 46 of the 63 Liberal Party congressmen, including President of Congress Roberto Micheletti – seen as a Flores ally, giving Zelaya what should be fairly strong loyalty from 74 percent of Liberal Party congressmen. 5. (C) It appears to Post that when Zelaya does choose a policy direction, such as on fuel (reftels A-C), the TEGUCIGALP 00000526 003.2 OF 007 President may have different goals than that of his advisors/ministers. Santos has clashed with Rodas ever since he was chosen as Zelaya’s running mate, and in February Santos told the Ambassador he was considering resigning, but during Zelaya’s recent trip to Panama and Chile Santos appears to have hit his stride. He is acting like a confident VP not worried about threats to his influence from within the party. Post would like to see Zelaya do the same and take the lead on what is best for Honduras, with the USG being a countervailing power to help Zelaya turn aside self-interested/corrupt groups within his party (and Honduran society) and conduct responsible political and economic reform. However it often seems that the fight is between an entrenched establishment, those seeking more radical change, and the great mass of Hondurans who need to feel tangible benefits to regain faith and democracy and free markets, with Zelaya’s policies not yet showing a consistent thread. 6. (C) Former President Flores hosted a meeting the evening of March 14 between the Ambassador and President Zelaya, with Flores and FM Jimenez participating in most of the meeting, in an attempt to help enhance bilateral relations and clarify any recent communication problems, such as during the ongoing fuel issue (reftels A-C). Before the meeting began Flores told the Ambassador privately that Zelaya does not seem to understand the consequences of his public statements. Zelaya, after telling the Ambassador that he makes some key decisions (such as fuel) on his own, told the Ambassador to stay in close contact with FM Jimenez, despite the fact that it was clear to the Ambassador that on crucial issues it will be necessary to go straight to Zelaya. Flores emphasized to Zelaya that aside from political considerations in his party, the only people a Honduran President needed to consult with were Roman Catholic Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez and the American Ambassador. Regional Security a Highlight —————————– 7. (C) Zelaya strongly supports USG efforts on counter-narcotics, and has accepted U.S. DOD assistance in drafting a Honduran National Security Strategy, with a workshop for his Administration planned for May 5-7. Combined training events are proceeding as planned, and a SOUTHCOM 15-person team recently visited to assess the operational capabilities of the Honduran military. Minister of Defense Aristedes Mejia’s decision to keep intact the military leadership (with some changes recently) has strengthened a strong relationship built during his tenure as President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal when the military was one of the few nonpartisan institutions that actually worked in the contested election. The Honduran military has also been at the forefront of the Zelaya Administration’s nascent efforts to protect natural resources, specifically to try to prevent illegal logging. The Embassy has found the Ministry of Defense to be a bright spot in the infant Zelaya Administration, helped by the fact that MOD Mejia is close to President Zelaya (see ref G). Immigration Reform Stalled ————————– TEGUCIGALP 00000526 004.6 OF 007 8. (SBU) The Zelaya Administration has continued GOH cooperation on deportation issues, including being the first Central American country to conduct video interviews of Hondurans awaiting deportation, with planes coming in daily, including permission for Saturday flights. In addition, GOH approval for use of San Pedro Sula for deportation flights continues, although the lack of promised resources from the USG means that San Pedro Sula has not yet been prepped for the intake of thousands of deportees. 9. (SBU) The GOH has not yet made discernible progress in reforming Honduran Immigration. Despite President Zelaya telling the Ambassador that he would move the immigration function from the Ministry of Government and Justice to the Foreign Ministry, it has not been moved. Indeed, the Director of Immigration told ConGen on March 7 that he had resigned after the Presidential Palace pressed his office to violate procedures to issue the President’s children diplomatic passports. (This resignation is not yet public as it will be accepted by the MinGov March 16.) A scandal broke, also in early March, when citizens of Albania, Lebanon, and Bosnia were admitted in apparent violation of Honduran immigration law. The scandal has the hallmarks of all Honduran scandals, i.e. several days of outraged newspaper articles, with intimations of private interests at stake, followed by grandstanding by law enforcement officials and, finally, no meaningful action or change. The Ambassador raised this scandal with President Zelaya during their March 14 discussions, in an attempt to break away from the dysfunctional status quo on Immigration. President Zelaya told the Ambassador in that discussion that German Espinal, former executive director of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, would be named to lead Immigration out of the Ministry of Government and Justice, but left it unclear if Immigration would be an independent entity. Ambassador and EmbOffs met with MinGov Reina March 16 and he announced he would form a commission to identify procedures for finding a new Director of Immigration to begin the reform process. MinGov Reina left open the possibility that immigration would remain in his Ministry or be moved elsewhere. Ambassador told Reina that the Mission looked forward to working with and supporting his reform efforts. Further details of this conversation will be reported septel. Ministry of Public Security Adding Cops but Slow to Reform ——————————————— ————- 10. (SBU) There is a widespread perception that street crime has increased significantly since Zelaya took over. While the statistics are not authoritative, there is certainly more crime reported in the press. There is no doubt that more Mission members have been crime victims in recent weeks than before. These crimes have involved the use of firearms and have taken place in upscale residential neighborhoods. (See ref H for more details.) 11. (C) There are a disturbing number of indications that police personnel are involved in some crimes, though such allegations, and evidence, are not unique to this government. While both Zelaya and Minister of Public Security Alvaro Romero have stated support for the rehabilitation of criminals, especially past gang members, preferring a multi-disciplinary approach that utilizes TEGUCIGALP 00000526 005.4 OF 007 governmental programs as well as NGOs with rehabilitation projects, the message sent has been criticized by many. In fact, one hypothesis is that weak leadership in the Ministry of Public Security has allowed bad elements in the police to act with greater impunity than before. Romero, despite his bold statements about police being part of the problem, has yet to take any measures to shake up the corrupt ranks of the police. On a positive note and fulfilling a campaign promise, Zelaya has begun to increase the police force by incorporating hundreds of military policemen who have recently completed their military service into the police force. He has also kept the Maduro Administration’s policy of boosting police patrols with military forces under “Honduras Segura.” Economic Policy a Mixed Bag: Trade Good, Fuel Bad ——————————————— —- 12. (C) Trade: The GOH has worked diligently to vet all proposed CAFTA-required legislation and regulations with the USG, and submitted those proposals to the Honduran Congress, which passed them March 15. Minister of Trade and Industry Elizabeth Azcona said she believes the needed approvals will be enacted in time for an entry into force of CAFTA on April 1. Post finds it particularly significant that the Zelaya Administration, following directly from Zelaya’s pro-free trade position, has accepted all key USG demands, and gotten congressional approval quickly over changes that will have significant impact on some key domestic interest groups. 13. (C) Energy: As discussed in refs A-C, the GOH has announced the nationalization of all fuel imports, and has threatened to also build its own storage facilities if existing facility owners do not agree to store the imported fuel at rates the GOH finds acceptable. If implemented, this action could constitute expropriation of a U.S. investment. 14. (C) Macroeconomic policy: The GOH continues to outperform International Monetary Fund targets. However, the GOH has privately asked the IMF to loosen certain targets, notably including public sector wages and overall fiscal deficit ceilings. There would be room in the program to do so and still attain minimum targets, but the IMF is concerned that the apparent flagging political will this early in the administration to make the difficult decisions bodes poorly for later years. 15. (C) Mining: In a February 10 meeting, Minister of Environment and Natural Resources (SERNA) Mayra Mejia told Ambassador that she understood the need to balance environmental protections and investor protections. She said she undertook to improve efficiency and transparency in her ministry. The following week, Mejia renewed the two-year old moratorium on new mining projects for another year, effectively blocking any new investment or significant expansion of existing investment. U.S. firm Mayan Gold, meanwhile, continues to suffer at the hands of illegal artesanal miners squatting on their gold-mining concession. To date, the company reports, neither SERNA nor the Public Ministry has taken any action to correct this illegal action. The mining legislation, pending since last summer, appears to be finally back on table for discussion. TEGUCIGALP 00000526 006.3 OF 007 16. (C) Agriculture: Based on the proposed sectoral budget for agriculture, the GOH appears to plan to shift significant resources (perhaps 60 percent of the overall sector budget) into supporting basic grains production (ref E). If enacted, this strikes Post as a significant step backwards, into an era of state-supported production of non-competitive commodities. It is also a rejection of the recent successes of projects demonstrating the economic benefits of producing non-traditional crops for export. 17. (C) Telecommunications: The GOH has thus far failed to pass pending telecommunications reform legislation, and reports indicate that efforts are underway in some quarters to gut the legislation, provide additional state support for failing parastatal Hondutel, and significantly weaken state telecommunications regulator Conatel. Post is cautiously optimistic that most of these negative changes will be reversed during the mark-up process, but laments the lack of GOH leadership seen thus far on the issue. 18. (C) Millennium Challenge Account (MCA): The Zelaya Administration has been willing to dedicate substantial efforts to launching the MCA program and as a result has received the first disbursement under the program. However, MCC staff are concerned that some selection of personnel has been based on personal relationships with the President and that competitive processes have been used to produce pre-determined results. In one case, this has resulted in MCC objecting to the appointment of the Director for FONADERS (a project implementation unit in the Ministry of Agriculture – see para. 20). MCC and other donors are also being lobbied by GOH officials to use concrete rather than asphalt in improvements to the major highway. While there may be legitimate reasons to use concrete, including problems with asphalt on stretches of the same road, Post is concerned that this may be motivated by Jaime Rosenthal, who owns a substantial portion of the production capacity for concrete in Honduras. 19. (C) Transparency: While the Zelaya Administration has announced that the private business interests of GOH ministers involved in the MCA process will not be able to bid on any MCA contracts, Post is increasingly concerned at the persistent GOH failure to grasp the essence of transparency in decision-making. The GOH has repeatedly shown that it considers inviting a wide group of participants to a meeting where the decision is presented as a fait accompli to be “transparent” – such as in the fuel issue. Another example is that FONADERS recently ran an open and competitive hiring process for its new director. President Zelaya overruled the review panel’s choice and instead insisted on installing a person he thought highly of from his days in the Flores Administration but with no agricultural background in the position. Early Enough to Change Direction ——————————– 20. (C) Comment: It is early enough in Zelaya’s presidency to make some key course corrections (especially on fuel), sideline some of his questionable advisors, and act decisively. He must both resist the temptation to act rashly to seek change for change’s sake, but also realize TEGUCIGALP 00000526 007.3 OF 007 that his honeymoon will end and if he is unwilling to take tough decisions he will soon find himself in the situation that President Ricardo Maduro did after six months. Maduro established that he was successful on fiscal policy, seen as trying to be successful on crime, and was not really serious about implementing any other fundamental changes. This impression, and his low popularity, stuck with him the remainder of his presidency, aside from a few hills and valleys (notably his clashes with teachers unions). Post is hopeful that Zelaya can adapt and set a bolder course that will help reform Honduras without breaking it. 21. (C) Comment Continued. To do this Zelaya must rely on his sincere pro-U.S. attitude and get past his apparent resentment of Honduran dependency on the U.S., with some of his advisors grating at the obvious nature of U.S. political and economic power. As Flores advised Zelaya, he must realize he cannot “fool the Americans,” and recognize his own inexperience and need for counsel. Post is guardedly optimistic that this early heart-to-heart between the Ambassador and President Zelaya will help prevent future disconnects and help Zelaya realize that his statements and actions will often have greater impact that his privately shared intentions. End Comment. Ford